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Eff ectiveness of battlefi eld-ethics training during combat 
deployment: a programme assessment
Christopher H Warner, George N Appenzeller, Angela Mobbs, Jessica R Parker, Carolynn M Warner, Thomas Grieger, Charles W Hoge 
Summary
Background Breakdowns in the ethical conduct of soldiers towards non-combatants on the battlefi eld are of grave 
concern in war. Evidence-based training approaches to prevent unethical conduct are scarce. We assessed the 
eff ectiveness of battlefi eld-ethics training and factors associated with unethical battlefi eld conduct.
Methods The training package, based on movie vignettes and leader-led discussions, was administered 7 to 8 months 
into a 15-month high-intensity combat deployment in Iraq, between Dec 11, 2007, and Jan 30, 2008. Soldiers from an 
infantry brigade combat team (total population about 3500) were randomly selected, on the basis of company and the 
last four digits of each soldier’s social security number, and invited to complete an anonymous survey 3 months after 
completion of the training. Reports of unethical behaviour and attitudes in this sample were compared with a 
randomly selected pre-training sample from the same brigade. The response patterns for ethical behaviour and 
reporting of ethical violations were analysed with chi-square analyses. We developed two logistic regression models 
using self-reported unethical behaviours as dependent variables. Factors associated with unethical conduct, including 
combat experiences and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), were assessed with validated scales.
Findings Of 500 randomly selected soldiers 421 agreed to participate in the anonymous post-training survey. A total of 
397 soldiers of the same brigade completed the pre-training survey. Training was associated with signifi cantly lower 
rates of unethical conduct of soldiers and greater willingness to report and address misconduct than in those before 
training. For example, reports of unnecessary damage or destruction of private property decreased from 13·6% 
(54 of 397; 95% CI 10·2–17·0) before training to 5·0% (21 of 421; 2·9–7·1) after training (percent diff erence –63·2%; 
p<0·0001), and willingness to report a unit member for mistreatment of a non-combatant increased from 36·0% 
(143 of 397; 31·3–40·7) to 58·9% (248 of 421; 54·2–63·6; percent diff erence 63·6; p<0·0001). Nearly all participants 
(410 [97%]) reported that training made it clear how to respond towards non-combatants. Combat frequency and 
intensity was the strongest predictor of unethical behaviour; PTSD was not a signifi cant predictor of unethical 
behaviour after controlling for combat experiences.
Interpretation Leader-led battlefi eld ethics training positively infl uenced soldiers’ understanding of how to interact 
with and treat non-combatants, and reduced reports of ethical misconduct. Unethical battlefi eld conduct was 
associated with high-intensity combat but not with PTSD.
Funding None.
Introduction
The ethical conduct of US military service members 
engaged in combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan 
came to the forefront of public attention with the events of 
Abu Ghraib (2004), Haditha (2006), and other highly 
publicised cases.1,2 In some of these cases, including recent 
allegations of murder of non-combatants by a sniper team 
in Iraq and a group of soldiers in a Stryker unit, unethical 
conduct has been attributed to the stresses of combat or 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).3,4 Unethical conduct 
has been a concern in previous wars.
In 2006, ethical issues were included for the fi rst time 
in the annual theatre-wide Mental Health Assessment 
Team (MHAT) survey of the wellbeing of US soldiers 
deployed in Iraq.5 The survey specifi cally addressed the 
issue of battlefi eld ethics and the adequacy of battlefi eld-
ethics training in the preparation of soldiers for combat 
operations in Iraq. The 2006 MHAT survey showed that 
less than 50% of soldiers were willing to report a member 
of their unit for ethical violations, 13% reported damag-
ing a non-combatant’s personal property, and 6% repor-
ted  hitting or kicking non-combatants unnecessarily 
(table 1).5 Additionally, soldiers with high levels of combat 
exposure or who met criteria for PTSD reported high 
levels of unethical conduct, although a systematic 
statistical analysis of factors associated with ethical 
misconduct was not reported.5
The fi ndings of the MHAT survey led to a recom-
mendation for the development of a battlefi eld-ethics 
training programme. However, at the time of the next 
MHAT survey in mid 2007, no systematic training 
programme had been developed, and the 2007 MHAT 
assessment showed levels of unethical conduct similar to 
that reported in the 2006 survey (table 1).6  
The unchanged levels of unethical conduct reported in 
the 2007 MHAT survey prompted the Commanding 
General of the Multi-National Division–Center in Iraq to 
develop and implement a battlefi eld-ethics training 
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programme for all soldiers under his command. In 
response to the Commander’s directive, a training 
development team was created, which was led by the 
Division Psychiatrist with representatives for the Staff  
Judge Advocate (legal), Division Surgeon (medical), 
Adjutant (personnel), and Chaplain. During the training 
development, experts in the specialties of both military 
and civilian ethics training were consulted.
The team did a review of military and medical reports 
and publications about ethical training, international 
humanitarian law, civilian protection in war, and combat 
stress behaviours. Many reports discussed the 
importance of ethical behaviour on the battlefi eld, the 
eff ect of violations, and the infl uence of group 
conformity and obedience on decision making in ethical 
dilemmas.7–15 One report13 cited a need for systematic 
training, noting that it should be a continuing process, 
and suggested that training should focus on enhancing 
moral reasoning and judgment and instilling particular 
values (eg, integrity, professionalism, responsibility). 
Reports preferentially focused on treatment of prisoners 
of war, ethical issues related to the provision of medical 
care, or scenarios with high ambiguity for which one 
could make strong arguments both for or against 
particular decisions (eg, whether to shoot an innocent 
child or risk the child revealing the location of soldiers 
on a secret mission behind enemy lines).14,15 However, 
few studies presented models for eff ective education 
with routine scenarios involving non-combatants 
encountered by soldiers on a day-to-day basis, and no 
specifi c outcome measures existed that were relevant to 
current operations in Iraq or Afghanistan until the 
publication of the MHAT survey results. Additionally, 
data about factors associated with battlefi eld ethical 
violations were scarce, which might inform 
training eff orts.
This review led to the development and implementation 
of a practical, scenario-based, battlefi eld-ethics training 
programme for use in theatre. We aimed to assess the 
eff ectiveness of the battlefi eld-ethics training programme, 
and to establish whether a change occurred in soldiers’ 
reports of how they treated non-combatants, attitudes 
towards unethical conduct, and their willingness to 
report ethical violations. We also assessed the association 
of PTSD, combat exposure, and other variables with 
unethical conduct on the battlefi eld.
Methods
Study design and participants
The training programme was developed in October, 2007, 
and implemented between Dec 11, 2007, and Jan 30, 2008. 
We compared the answers from anonymous cross-sectional 
surveys done before and after battlefi eld-ethics training in 
randomly selected soldiers from one brigade combat team 
during a 15-month deployment to Iraq (total brigade 
population about 3500). The pre-training survey included 
all respondents from the brigade who had participated in 
the annual theatre-wide MHAT survey in August, 2007, 
about 3–4 months into a 15-month deployment and before 
the training was undertaken. Training was given 
7–8 months into the deployment, and then the second 
cross-sectional survey was administered by the study 
investigators 3–4 months after the training with the same 
methods used in the 2007 MHAT survey. In addition to the 
MHAT questions, we included questions to assess the 
training and factors associated with unethical conduct. To 
ensure comparable 3-month observation periods, survey 
questions asked before training referred to behaviours 
occurring since the beginning of deployment. Questions 
asked after training referred to behaviours in the most 
recent 3 months of the deployment. Permission to 
undertake this study was obtained from the in-theatre 
MHAT 20065 (N=1320) MHAT 20076 (N=2195)
Unethical behaviours* 
Insulted and/or cursed non-combatants in their presence 490 (37%) 740 (34%)
Damaged and/or destroyed private property when it was not necessary 173 (13% ) 312 (14%)
Physically hit/kicked a non-combatant when it was not necessary 77 (6%) 138 (6%)
Members of my unit “modify” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission 143 (11%) 171 (8%)
Members of my unit “ignore” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission 79 (6%) 99 (5%)
Reporting of ethical violations†
I would report a unit member for the mistreatment of a non-combatant 478 (36%) 738 (34%)
I would report a unit member for injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant 581 (44%) 891 (41%)
I would report a unit member for unnecessarily destroying private property 411 (31%) 656 (30%)
I would report a unit member for stealing from a non-combatant 499 (38%) 748 (34%)
I would report a unit member for violating the Rules of Engagement 479 (36%) 777 (35%)
I would report a unit member for not following General Orders 483 (37%) 764 (35%) 
Data are number (%). MHAT=Mental Health Assessment Team. *Unethical behaviours that occurred one or more times were reported. †Willingness to report ethical 
violations were assessed by reporting whether soldiers agreed or strongly agreed with each statement. 
Table 1: Unethical behaviours and willingness to report ethical violations among soldiers deployed to Iraq, according to US army Mental Health 
Assessment Team reports
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Institutional Review Board (IRB), which included 
monitoring and approval both from senior medical 
researchers in-theatre, and the IRB at Brooke Army 
Medical Center, San Antonio, TX, USA, that was 
responsible for oversight of in-theatre medical research.
Procedures
The battlefi eld-ethics training team conferred with the 
US Army Judge Advocate General Center and School, the 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and several 
civilian experts in ethics, and chose to expand on the 
foundation of Law of War (including the Geneva 
Conventions) and the current US Army Values through 
structured discussions of specifi c movie vignettes 
involving ethical dilemmas.16,17 The focus of the training 
related to concerns identifi ed in the MHAT surveys or 
serious violations that had come to media attention (eg, 
treatment of non-combatants, looting and pillaging, 
killing non-combatants, Rules of Engagement, and 
willingness to report ethical violations).5,6
In the 2007 MHAT focus groups, many soldiers 
reported a desire to hear from those who had previously 
Summary
• Task: conduct battlefi eld-ethics training.
• Format: video or slide directed discussion in a leader-led 
chain-teaching format.
• Purpose: to promote adherence, protect against 
unnecessary suff ering and collateral damage, and to 
promote the humane treatment of non-combatants.
• Conditions: leaders are provided with a training disc with 
slides and videos and a script of key talking points to discuss 
in each section. Total training time is 60–90 min. 
Introduction
• During this section the leader covers the key points of the 
Army Values, basic principles of the Law of War, the Soldier 
Rules, and the indicators of potential misconduct. The 
leader also reviews the key data about battlefi eld ethical 
behaviour from the studies done by the Mental Health 
Assessment Team.
Treatment of non-combatants
• Scene (movie clip: Platoon; start 47 min 20 s, length 
2 min 45 s): unit searching a village immediately following 
a signifi cant enemy engagement. 
• Key discussion items: coping with stress, balancing excessive 
versus prudent force, Rules of Engagement, and preventing 
maladaptive stress induced responses.
• Warning signs discussed included cursing, destroying 
property for no reason, or killing of animals.
Looting, pillaging, and treatment of wounded 
• Scene (movie clip: Patriot; start 26 min 20 s, length 
3 min 40 s): depicts a civilian providing aid and assistance to 
soldiers from both sides.
• Key discussion items: soldiers might feel they earned the 
right to loot and pillage, or commanders might do this to 
instil fear; however, these short-term gains have long-term 
consequences and violate the Law of War. The Geneva 
Conventions make clear that enemies wounded in action 
are no longer enemy combatants and should be provided 
medical care. 
Killing non-combatants
• Scene 1 (movie clip: Platoon; start 50 min: 22 s, 
length 2 min 15 s): rage attack against villagers.  
• Scene 2 (movie clip: Black Hawk Down; start 61 min 35 s, 
length 25 s): determining if a child is an enemy combatant.  
• Key discussion items: in most instances, the killing of 
non-combatants is clearly wrong and illegal and must be 
dealt with through the military judicial system, it hurts the 
mission and the unit. However, in some instances substantial 
ambiguity exists. Determining if a child or adolescent is a 
non-combatant can sometime be diffi  cult. Focus is on 
identifi cation of non-combatants versus enemy combatants.
Rules of Engagement 
• Scene (movie clip: Three Kings; start 0 min 55 s, length 
1 min 7 s): soldiers are being indecisive about how to 
engage and interact with possible enemy combatants. 
• Key discussion items: soldiers always have the innate right 
to protect themselves; however, the Rules of Engagement 
provide guidelines for soldiers’ actions. Failure to follow the 
rules could place the mission at risk. Emphasis is placed on 
understanding the current Rules of Engagement for the 
operational theatre.
Reporting ethical violations
• Scene (movie clip: Home of the Brave; start 11 min 45 s, 
length 2 min): soldiers are involved in a continuing urban 
battle where a civilian is wounded and killed in the fog of war.
• Key discussion items: data about soldiers’ willingness to 
report potential violations and attitudes towards 
investigations; the importance of soldiers’ understanding 
that investigations after combat incidents are not just 
about determining wrong-doing but are also about 
providing reassurance that the proper steps and actions are 
taken, and garnering the lessons that can be learned.
Warning signs and protective factors
• Warning signs and associated factors contributing toward 
unethical behaviour: use of drugs and alcohol, high combat 
exposure, unaddressed mental health problems, poor 
equal-opportunity climate, failure of expected support, 
poor unit cohesion, low confi dence in unit leadership.
• Protective factors: leadership, high unit cohesion, early 
recognition and addressing of combat operational stress, 
sleep, rest and refi t, eff ective communication, after-action 
debriefi ng.
Panel 1: Overview of the in-theatre battlefi eld-ethics training programme
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deployed and from their unit leaders about how they 
should handle ethical dilemmas.6 Furthermore, many 
soldiers reported that they did not fi nd behavioural 
training with “typical powerpoint briefi ngs” eff ective.6 
Consequently, the training that was developed consisted 
of a leader-led interactive programme with brief video 
vignettes to highlight key learning points and serve as 
starting points for discussions. A military legal review 
permitted the use of clips from popular movies for this 
educational purpose, and unit commanders approved 
the content.
The division implemented a chain-teaching format in 
which senior leaders taught their immediate subordinate 
leaders. The subordinate leaders then taught their own 
subordinate leaders until the training involved all military 
personnel. Training sessions were done in small groups 
to promote discussion among those who served in 
combat together. To ensure that the training was 
standardised throughout, unit leaders were provided 
with a script that included key questions and discussion 
points for each video vignette. The leaders were 
encouraged to link these discussions to current situations 
and issues that the unit was facing. An overview of the 
training programme is provided in panel 1.
For the pre-training comparison sample, 397 soldiers 
were identifi ed as belonging to the study brigade from a 
total of 2195 who completed MHAT surveys in brigades 
throughout theatre. These soldiers were identifi ed on the 
basis of unit identifi ers in the otherwise anonymous 
MHAT survey database.6 This dataset, gathered 3–4 months 
into the brigade’s deployment, contained only the 
responses to demographic, combat exposure, and 
battlefi eld-ethics questions from the larger MHAT survey. 
The sampling methods of the 2007 MHAT survey have 
been described previously.6 Briefl y, 25 soldiers from 
randomly selected line and support companies within 
brigade combat teams throughout Iraq were selected. 
Although most of the MHAT data gathered in Iraq 
allowed for convenience sampling in randomly selected 
companies, a random method of soldier selection in each 
of the selected companies was used in the brigade chosen 
for this study, on the basis of the last four digits of each 
soldier’s social security number. Soldiers who were 
approached for participation in the MHAT survey were 
informed of the voluntary and anonymous nature of the 
survey, which was administered according to a protocol 
approved by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
institutional review board.6
For the recruitment of participants to the post-training 
sample, which was done with a protocol approved by the 
in-theatre institutional review board, 500 soldiers were 
randomly selected from the same brigade that participated 
in the 2007 MHAT study with the same random selection 
methods. Specifi cally, 25 soldiers were selected from 
each Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta companies of the 
fi ve subordinate battalions within the brigade, for a total 
of 500. All soldiers for whom the last four numbers of 
their social security numbers began with 3, 6, or 9 had 
their names placed on individual cards in a container 
with no identifi ers visible and 25 were drawn from the 
container. Once identifi ed, the selected soldiers were 
approached by the unit’s medical provider and invited to 
complete an anonymous paper survey. Soldiers were 
informed that participation was voluntary, would remain 
anonymous, and that their participation or non-
participation would have no negative eff ect on them. To 
ensure the anonymity of participants in the study, no 
personal identifying information was collected on the 
survey and the completed surveys were placed in a sealed 
envelope and locked drop box at the medical aid station, 
which was accessible only by the investigators. Because 
this survey was anonymous, a requirement for signed 
consent was waived, and completion of the survey was 
classed as consent.
Both surveys, done before and after battlefi eld-ethics 
training, included the same questions related to ethical 
behaviour and reporting of ethical violations, combat 
exposure, and demographic information (age, rank, sex, 
education, deployment history, time spent outside the 
forward operating base).5,6 The PTSD checklist-military 
(PCL-M) 17 and the patient health questionnaire (PHQ) 9, 
which have been validated and widely used in military and 
veteran populations, were used to assess for PTSD and 
depression in the soldiers who completed the survey after 
training.18–21 Additionally, nine statements about soldiers’ 
attitudes towards the battlefi eld-ethics chain-teaching 
programme were included in the post-training survey.
The combat exposure section included 15 statements in 
which respondents were asked how many times a series 
of combat events occurred during deployment, with a 
fi ve-point response from 1 (never) to 5 (10 times or more) 
for each event. The sections on ethical behaviours and 
reporting of ethical violations included a subset of the 
questions from the 2007 MHAT survey in which 
respondents were asked to rate seven questions, on a 
fi ve-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (fi ve times or more), 
about how often they engaged in a specifi c unethical 
behaviour in the past 90 days. Additionally, the soldiers 
were asked to rate how much they disagree or agree with 
an additional 11 statements about attitudes toward 
reporting ethical violations on a fi ve-point scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Questions related 
to ethical conduct focused on attitudes and specifi c 
behaviours that were somewhat subjective (ie, insulting 
non-combatants, damaging property, or hitting or kicking 
a non-combatant “when it was not necessary”), to 
encourage honest reporting on the anonymous surveys, 
as had been done in previous MHAT surveys.
The PCL-M is a 17-item self-report checklist, directly 
adapted from the PTSD criteria in the Diagnostic and 
Statisical Manual IV. The checklist is keyed specifi cally 
to stressful military experiences. Soldiers were asked to 
rate how much they have been bothered in the past 
month by various experiences on a fi ve-point scale 
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ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Scoring was 
accomplished by summing the responses of each 
question with the total score ranging from 17 to 85. The 
PCL-M has been validated and widely used in military 
populations, and a score of 50 or greater has been 
deemed optimum for the identifi cation of PTSD in 
population-level research.18,19
The PHQ 9 is a nine item, self-administered version of 
the depression module of the primary care evaluation of 
mental disorders.20 This test assesses the nine diagnostic 
criteria for depression on a scale 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly 
every day) and is used widely in the military.21 When the 
test is used for screening, the individual responses are 
summed (scale range 0–34). Scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 
have high reliability and validity for mild, moderate, 
moderately severe, and severe depression, and a cutoff  of 
10 was selected for this study.20
Statistical analyses
All data were entered into an SPSS (version 12.02) 
database. The primary focus was on descriptive statistics 
including the reported rates of ethical behaviours among 
soldiers, willingness to report ethical violations, prevalence 
of probable PTSD on the basis of the established cutoff  
scores on the PCL-M, prevalence of depressive symptoms 
on the basis of the PHQ 9, and number of combat 
exposures. Pre-training and post-training survey 
responses were compared using chi-square analyses.
We developed two logistic regression models using 
self-reported unethical behaviours as dependent variables, 
including soldiers’ participation in insulting or cursing at 
non-combatants and mistreatment of non-combatants 
(defi ned as either unnecessary damage or destruction of 
non-combatant property or unnecessarily hitting or 
kicking non-combatants). The independent variables that 
were assessed included age (less than 25 vs 25 years or 
older), sex, rank, completion of previous combat 
deployments (any vs none), highest level of education, 
current symptoms suggestive of depression or PTSD, 
time spent outside the  forward operating base (greater 
than 20 h per week versus 20 h or less per week), and a 
sum of combat exposures. Both individual associations 
between dependent and independent variables and 
adjusted associations were assessed. 
Role of the funding source
No industry grants or fi nancial support were used in this 
project. Study design, data collection, data analysis, data 
interpretation, and writing of the report were completed 
entirely by the study investigators and they had full access 
to all data in the study. The corresponding author had full 
access to all data in the study and had fi nal responsibility 
to submit for publication.
Results 
The training was completed in all brigades under the 
Multi-National Division—Center Iraq, including about 
3500 soldiers in the brigade combat team selected for 
this study. Of these soldiers, 500 were randomly selected 
to participate in the post-training survey, and 
421 (84%) voluntarily chose to participate. The sample 
included mostly male enlisted soldiers, who were on 
Before 
battlefi eld-ethics 
training (N=397)
After 
battlefi eld-ethics 
training (N=421)
Chi square 
(degrees of 
freedom=1)
p value
Sex
Female 49 (12%) 61 (14%) 0·635 0·43
Male 348 (88%) 360 (86%) 0·635 0·43
Age (years)
17–25 183 (46%) 173 (41%) 1·882 0·17
≥26 214 (54%) 248 (59%) 1·882 0·17
Prior deployment history
0 191 (48%) 216 (51%) 0·712 0·40
1 132 (33%) 125 (30%) 1·041 0·31
≥2 74 (19%) 80 (19%) 0·002 0·96
Rank
E1–E4* 230 (58%) 218 (52%) 2·879 0·09
E5–E9† 143 (36%) 167 (40%) 1·005 0·32
Offi  cers or Warrant Offi  cers 24 (6%) 36 (8%) 1·537 0·22
Education
GED or high school NA 192 (46%) NA NA
Some college NA 170 (40%) NA NA
College graduate NA 59 (14%) NA NA
Mental health
PTSD or depression 71 (18%) 92 (22%) 1·776 0·18
Combat exposures
Being attacked or ambushed 199 (50%) 213 (51%) 0·004 0·95
Small arms fi re 146 (37%) 163 (39%) 0·250 0·62
Saw dead bodies or human remains 129 (33%) 170 (40%) 5·145 0·02
Handling human remains 87 (22%) 100 (24%) 0·294 0·26
Witnessing violence 101 (25%) 131 (31%) 2·966 0·09
Seeing dead Americans 114 (29%) 157 (37%) 6·403 0·01
Knowing someone seriously injured 
or killed
207 (52%) 249 (59%) 3·784 0·05
IED exploded nearby 113 (29%) 141 (34%) 2·184 0·14
Hostile reactions from civilians 122 (31%) 128 (30%) 0·001 0·98
Threatened and unable to respond 118 (30%) 95 (23%) 5·070 0·02
Shooting or fi ring 75 (19%) 109 (26%) 5·347 0·02
Clearing or searching homes or 
buildings
109 (28%) 114 (27%) 0·002 0·96
Being wounded or injured 23 (6%) 31 (7%) 0·582 0·45
Seeing ill or wounded women 
or children
77 (19%) 91 (22%) 0·488 0·45
Encountering sniper fi re 61 (15%) 83 (20%) 2·374 0·12
Time outside of the forward operating base
≥20 h 153 (39%) 139 (33%) 2·479 0·12
Data are number (%). NA=not available. GED=general equivalency diploma. PTSD=post-traumatic stress disorder. 
IED=improvised explosive device. *These ranks included Private (recruit; E1), Private (E2), Private First Class (E3), and 
Specialist or Corporal (E4). †These ranks include Sergeant (E5), Staff  Sergeant (E6), Sergeant First Class (E7), Master 
Sergeant or First Sergeant (E8), Sergeant Major, or Command Sergeant Major (E9).
Table 2: Demographics and combat experiences in soldiers before and after training
Articles
920 www.thelancet.com   Vol 378   September 3, 2011
their fi rst combat deployment (table 2). Most (404 [96%]) 
acknowledged completing the unit battlefi eld-ethics 
training programme, which was consistent with training 
logs kept by the brigade that showed 100% compliance 
with the training requirement. More than half reported 
that they had either been attacked or ambushed or knew 
someone who had been injured or killed in Iraq (table 2). 
Chi-square analyses showed that the pre-training and 
post-training groups had comparable demographics, 
mental health concerns, and time outside the forward 
operating base. The post-training group had higher levels 
of several combat experiences than did the pre-training 
group, which was an expected fi nding. 
More than a fi fth of post-training survey respondents 
met screening criteria for depression or PTSD, which 
was comparable to the prevalence in the pre-training 
sample (table 2). 42 (10%) soldiers met screening criteria 
for PTSD as defi ned by a PCL-M score of 50 or higher, 
while 79 (19%) had symptoms of depression as defi ned 
by a PHQ-9 score of 10 or higher. The mean PCL-M score 
was 28·6 (SD 14·0, 95% CI 27·3–29·9) and the mean 
PHQ 9 score was 4·8 (SD 5·6, 95% CI 4·2–5·4). A third 
of participants reported that they spent more than 20 h 
per week outside the forward operating base, which was 
comparable to that before training (table 2). 
Most soldiers who completed the post-training survey 
reported some form of combat exposure (367 [87%]), with 
the overall sample averaging 11·8 (SD 12·3, 95% CI 
10·5–13·1) exposures on a scale of 0–45 exposures. Nearly 
all of those who spent more than 20 h per week outside 
the forward operating base reported combat exposure 
(134 [96%]), and many of those who spent most of their 
time on the forward operating base also reported combat 
exposures (233 [83%]). However, we identifi ed a notable 
diff erence in the mean number of combat exposures per 
soldier between those who spent more than 20 h per week 
outside the base camp (19·1 [SD 14·3, 95% CI 16·7–21·5]) 
and the other soldiers (8·2 [9·3, 7·1–9·3). All but one of 
the soldiers who met screening criteria for PTSD reported 
combat exposures during deployment.
Table 3 compares the ethical attitudes and behaviours 
reported by soldiers 3–4 months after training completion 
and those reported before training (which referred to the 
3–4 month period from the beginning of the deployment). 
Signifi cant increases were seen in soldiers’ perceptions of 
their preparedness for encountering non-combatants 
(table 3). Decreased rates of unethical conduct were noted 
in all categories after training, with signifi cant reductions 
in reports of insulting or cursing at non-combatants, 
unnecessary damage or destruction of private property, or 
witnessing mistreatment by a fellow unit member. 
Signifi cant reductions were seen in all categories of 
attitudes related to reporting of a fellow soldier for ethical 
misconduct (table 3).
Number before training 
(%; 95% CI)*
Number after training 
(%; 95% CI)†
Percent 
diff erence
Chi square 
(degrees of 
freedom=1)
p value
Questions on perceived adequacy of training (agree or strongly agree)
The training I received in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants was adequate 287 (72·3%; 67·9–76·7) 399 (94·8%; 92·6–97·0%) 31·1 74·67 <0·0001
I encountered ethical situations in which I didn’t know how to respond 119 (30·0%; 25·5–34·5) 47 (11·2%; 8·2–14·2%) –62·7 43·54 <0·0001
I received training that made it clear how I should behave towards non-combatants 295 (74·%; 70·0–78·6) 410 (97·4%; 95·9–98·9%) 31·1 89·49 <0·0001
Actual behaviours and experiences during deployment (one or more times)
Insulted and/or cursed non-combatants in their presence 118 (29·7%; 25·2–34·2) 87 (20·7%; 16·8–24·5%) –30·3 8·45 0·004
Damaged and/or destroyed private property when it was not necessary 54 (13·6%; 10·2–17·0) 21 (5·0%; 2·9–7·1%) –63·2 17·19 <0·0001
Physically hit/kicked a non-combatant when it was not necessary 24 (6·1%; 3·7–8·4) 14 (3·3%; 1·6–5·0%) –45·9 2·82 0·093
Witnessed the brutality/mistreatment of a non-combatant by a unit member 34 (8·6%; 5·8–11·3) 12 (2·9%; 1·3–4·4%) –66·2 11·52 0·0007
Stopped a fellow unit member from mistreating a non-combatant 20 (5·0%; 2·9–7·2) 12 (2·9%; 1·3–4·4%) –42·0 2·05 0·152
Members of my unit “modify” the Rules of Engagement to accomplish the mission 26 (6·6%; 4·1–9·0) 19 (4·5%; 2·5–6·5%) –31·8 1·26 0·261
Members of my unit “ignore” the Rules of Engagement to accomplish the mission 13 (3%; 1·5–5·0) 11 (2·6%; 1·1–4·1%) –21·2 0·13 0·724
Attitudes toward ethical conduct (agree or strongly agree)
I would report a unit member for the mistreatment of a non-combatant 143 (36·0%; 31·3–40·7) 248 (58·9%; 54·2–63·6%) 63·6 41·98 <0·0001
I would report a unit member for injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant 165 (41·6%; 36·7– 46·4) 271 (64·4%; 59·8–68·9%) 54·8 41·79 <0·0001
I would report a unit member for unnecessarily destroying private property 131 (33·0%; 28·4–37·6) 250 (59·4%; 54·7–64·1%) 80·0 56·11 <0·0001
I would report a unit member for stealing from a non-combatant 146 (36·8%; 32·0–41·5) 259 (61·6%; 56·9–66·2%) 67·4 49·06 <0·0001
I would report a unit member for violating the Rules of Engagement 148 (37·3%; 32·5–42·0) 261 (62·0%; 57·4–66·6%) 66·2 48·94 <0·0001
I would report a unit member for not following General Orders 156 (39·3%; 34·5–44·1) 256 (60·8%; 56·2–65·4%) 54·7 36·97 <0·0001
Torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a soldier 154 (38·8%; 34·0–43·6) 115 (27·3%; 23·1–31·6%) –29·6 11·68 0·0006
Torture should be allowed to gather important information about insurgents 135 (34·0%; 29·4–38·7) 96 (22·8%; 18·8–26·8%) –32·9 12·11 0·0005
Data are number (%; 95% CI) unless stated otherwise. *N=397. †N=421.
Table 3: Association of battlefi eld-ethics training with ethical attitudes and behaviours of soldiers
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When the post-training ethical behaviours were 
examined, about a fi fth of soldiers responded that they had 
participated in insulting or cursing at non-combatants, 
compared with about a third of those before training; 
reports of damaging or destroying private property when it 
was not necessary decreased from nearly 14% to 5%, and 
reports of witnessing brutality or mistreatment of non-
combatants by a unit member decreased from nearly 9% 
to 3% (table 3). Signifi cant increases were seen in the 
willingness of soldiers to report ethical violations (table 3).
The unadjusted univariate logistic regression models 
(table 4) showed that a positive screening for PTSD or 
depression, spending more than 20 h outside the forward 
operating base, and high-intensity combat (on the basis of 
the exposure score) all showed signifi cant associations 
with mistreatment of non-combatants (ie, unnecessary 
damage to property or unnecessarily hitting or kicking 
non-combatants). However, when these associations were 
adjusted in a model that combined these variables together 
with demographics (age, sex, rank, education, and history 
of prior deployment), only combat exposure remained a 
signifi cant predictor of mistreatment of non-combatants. 
PTSD, time outside the base-camp, and combat exposure 
did predict yelling and cursing at non-combatants, 
although combat exposure again greatly attenuated the 
strength of these associations in adjusted analyses.
The fi gure outlines the soldiers’ attitudes towards the 
training programme. Most considered the format to be 
Insulted or cursed at non-combatants Damaged or destroyed property or hit or kicked a 
non-combatant when it was not necessary
n (%) Unadjusted Adjusted* n (%) Unadjusted Adjusted*
Odds ratio p value Odds ratio p value Odds ratio p value Odds ratio p value
Depression (PHQ 9 ≥10) 25 (28·7%) 2·09 0·008 1·47 0·285 12 (42·9%) 3·65 0·001 2·88 0·051
PTSD (PCL-M ≥50) 18 (20·7%) 3·37 <0·0001 1·64 0·277 8 (28·6%) 4·22 0·002 1·00 0·994
>20 h outside the 
forward operating base
46 (52·9%) 2·87 <0·0001 1·45 0·201 16 (57·1%) 2·89 0·007 1·11 0·832
Combat exposure 
(continuous variable)
84 (96·6%) 1·068 <0·0001 1·06 <0·0001 28 (100·0%) 1·08 0·000 1·07 <0·0001
PHQ 9=patient health questionnaire 9. PTSD=post-traumatic stress disorder. PCL-M=PTSD checklist-military. *Adjusted analyses included depression, PTSD, time working 
outside the forward operating base, combat exposure, and demographics (age, sex, prior deployment, rank, and education).
Table 4: Association of mental health problems, time working outside the forward operating base, and combat exposure with unethical behaviours 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
24 (5·7%)
134 (31·8%)
263 (62·3%)
26 (6·2%)
134 (31·8%)
261 (62·0%)
26 (6·2%)
162 (38·5%)
233 (55·3%)
28 (6·7%)
147 (34·9%)
246 (58·4%)
26 (6·2%)
175 (41·6%)
220 (52·3%)
28 (6·7%)
163 (38·7%)
230 (54·6%)
21 (5·0%)
183 (43·5%)
217 (51·5%)
18 (4·3%)
159 (37·8%)
244 (58·0%)
16 (3·8%)
151 (35·9%)
254 (60·3%)
The teaching made clear the impact unethical behaviours can have on the mission
The teaching made clear the impact unethical behaviours can have on a unit
Chain teaching is an effective way to teach ethics
The movie clips helped me have a better understanding of the topics being discussed
The training used good examples
The training gave the impression that all soldiers are committing ethical violations
It was helpful for me to hear my leader’s thoughts about the ethical problems soldiers face
The training made clear how my leaders expect me to react when faced with a potential 
ethical dilemma on the battlefield
I learned the actions to take if I witness a potential ethical violation
Disagree or strongly disagree Neutral Agree or strongly agree
Figure: Soldiers’ attitudes toward battlefi eld-ethics training
N=421.
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eff ective and nearly two-thirds noted that they learned 
what actions to take and understood the eff ect that ethical 
violations can have on a unit’s mission. We did subgroup 
analyses to compare the perceptions of training with 
PTSD, time outside the operating base, and combat 
exposures; no signifi cant diff erences or trends were 
noted in any of these analyses.
Discussion
Results from our assessment of the battlefi eld-ethics 
training programme suggest that soldiers’ behaviours 
and attitudes towards the treatment of non-combatants 
can be positively infl uenced through leader-led training 
discussions (panel 2). The conduct of US military 
personnel on the battlefi eld has potential far-reaching 
consequences on tactical mission eff ectiveness and the 
strategic success of entire operations with coalition 
partners. Two past surveys done during the Iraq 
deployment in 2006 and 2007, suggested that 13–14% of 
US soldiers reported damaging or destroying private 
property and 6% reported hitting or kicking a non-
combatant when it was not necessary (table 1).5,6 This type 
of behaviour has serious moral and legal ramifi cations, 
and can damage military relations with local populations 
and jeopardise the ability of the US and coalition forces 
from other nations to achieve military objectives.
One of the important fi ndings of our study is that 
PTSD was not associated with unethical conduct after 
controlling for combat experiences. The intensity of 
direct combat seemed to be the strongest predictor of 
unethical conduct, which is borne out also by many 
anecdotes of combat veterans who describe intense and 
sometimes uncontrollable rage in association with 
horrifi c events, such as losing a close team member.22 
The soldiers who spent more than 20 h per week outside 
the fortifi ed and protected forward operating bases 
averaged a greater number of combat exposures than did 
those who spent less time outside the base. This group 
also interacted more frequently with the civilian 
populace, placing them in situations where non-
combatant mistreatment could occur. The results suggest 
that training in battlefi eld ethics should be prioritised, 
especially for those units expected to engage in high-
intensity direct combat and who will have the most 
interaction with the civilian, non-combatant population.
The degree to which ethical attitudes and reported 
behaviours could be modifi ed through training is an 
encouraging fi nding. The training was well received by 
soldiers. The brief video clips provided a framework for 
discussion of topics relevant to the day-to-day scenarios 
that these soldiers were encountering, sometimes 
including ambiguous and diffi  cult ethical dilemmas. The 
chain teaching provided a method for unit leaders to give 
guidance on how they expected their subordinates to 
respond to ethically challenging situations and also 
allowed for direct discussion between participants about 
situations they had actually encountered in their work. 
Furthermore, the leaders’ personal engagement in the 
training emphasised the priority of the topic, and 
modelled what was expected throughout the rest of the 
deployment. The use of a script ensured that the key 
teaching points were delivered consistently across the 
diff erent leader-led discussions.
Further studies are needed to refi ne the battlefi eld-ethics 
training methods, improve the sustainability and 
reproducibility of the training eff ects, and establish the 
most eff ective training implementation plans. On the basis 
of the initial feedback used in this intervention, we strongly 
suggest that future training includes engagement of unit 
leaders with their subordinates on these issues. The use of 
popular movie clips seemed to be helpful in facilitating 
discussion. However, the success of this programme was 
probably not related to the specifi c vignettes selected, but 
rather to the discussion by leaders that led to a cultural 
change in which unit awareness of ethical issues and 
leadership expectations improved.
An important limitation of this study was the absence 
of a randomised or experimental design, which was not 
possible in the operational environment, and therefore 
the outcomes and conclusions were observational and 
dependent on the comparability of the pre-training and 
post-training samples. Data from both samples were 
gathered from within the same unit with the same 
random sampling methods, and with comparable 
timeframes of reference. Analysis confi rmed that data 
for demographics and exposure to direct combat of the 
two samples were comparable, which was also 
representative of the theatre-wide MHAT survey sample. 
Soldiers’ perceptions of training, including the use of 
movie vignettes and leader-led discussions, were positive, 
with many soldiers attributing improved understanding 
of how to handle ethical dilemmas to training.
Soldiers’ attitudes could have changed during deploy-
ment because of experience or time in theatre, and not 
Panel 2: Research in context
Systematic review 
We searched both military reports and MEDLINE for reports 
published between Jan 1, 1970, and Oct 1, 2007, with the 
search terms “military ethics”, “battlefi eld ethics”, “combat 
ethics”, “soldier ethics”, “ethics education”, “ethical training”, 
“treatment of non-combatants”, “international humanitarian 
law”, “civilian protection in war”, and “combat stress”.  
Interpretation
Our fi ndings have important implications for how military 
leaders prepare their forces for military operations ranging 
from peacekeeping to combat. Furthermore, unethical 
battlefi eld conduct was associated with high-intensity 
combat but not with PTSD, countering a commonly held 
belief that PTSD is a cause of such behaviour. Additional 
studies are needed to refi ne, disseminate, and further assess 
the eff ectiveness of battlefi eld-ethics training.
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directly because of training. However, previous theatre-
wide MHAT surveys showed no improvement in ethical 
attitudes and behaviour associated with time in theatre.6 
Furthermore, the relation between unethical behaviours 
and number of combat exposures would suggest an 
expected worsening in attitudes and behaviour with 
increased time in theatre because of the likelihood of 
additional exposure rather than the recorded improvement 
in this sample.
Linkage of pre-training and post-training responses for 
individual soldiers and control for possible confounding 
from temporal changes in responses (eg, improved 
attitudes over time as a result of experience in theatre, 
independent of training) was not possible because of the 
anonymous nature of reporting. However, an additional 
post-hoc analysis of all soldiers who completed the 
2007 MHAT survey showed that longer time in theatre 
was associated with higher rates of unethical behaviours 
and reduced willingness to report a team member for 
mistreatment of a non-combatant (Col Paul Bliese, 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Silver Spring, 
MD, USA, personal communication).6 Thus, the 
signifi cant improvement in outcomes seen between pre-
training and post-training assessments in the study 
brigade is particularly noteworthy. 
Another study limitation is the reliance on self-
reported measures and the subjectivity of some of the 
questions (eg, which behaviours soldiers perceived as 
“necessary” in the combat environment). However, the 
consistency and strength of associations across the 
various outcome measures supports the conclusion that 
the training had a positive eff ect on both ethical attitudes 
and actual behaviours.
Individuals might have underreported misconduct, 
avoided participation in the survey out of fear that they 
might face disciplinary action if their survey responses 
were identifi able, or responded in a manner that was 
perceived as desirable to the unit leaders and military 
environment. However, the anonymous reporting, 
precautions to ensure that surveys were not accessible to 
unit peers or leaders, and use of questions that focused 
on attitudes and somewhat subjective behaviours 
probably encouraged honest reporting. Evidence 
suggests that soldiers are much more willing to report 
sensitive mental-health concerns on anonymous surveys 
than in screening surveys used in non-anonymous 
confi dential clinical settings.23 Furthermore, soldiers’ 
responses were consistent in this study sample as 
compared with previous theatre-wide anonymous 
surveys, which used the same questions. The survey 
sampling design and protection of soldiers’ identities 
with anonymous surveys were identical for the pre-
training and post-training groups, and the post-training 
survey was administered 3–4 months after training 
rather than in close proximity. Therefore, diff erences 
attributable to social desirability or diff erent levels of 
concern about anonymity are unlikely.
Our fi nding that battlefi eld-ethics training with leader-
led discussions positively infl uenced soldiers’ behaviours 
and attitudes towards the treatment of non-combatants 
has implications for the conduct of many peacekeeping 
and combat operations worldwide. Although battlefi eld 
ethical conduct is judged to be crucial to mission success, 
and training is increasingly being included in the 
curriculum of military organisations internationally,7,13,24 
we are not aware of any other systematic programme 
assessment. The results of this study can inform training 
programmes worldwide, including a North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) initiative, chartered in 2009, 
to develop and implement moral dilemma training for 
all NATO forces.25 Our study is the fi rst published study 
to provide both potential methods for preventing 
unethical conduct and associated factors for unethical 
battlefi eld conduct.
Emphasis should be placed on training those with 
high levels of combat exposure, and should include 
experientially-based leader-led discussions.
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